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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 920110 
v. : 
DOUGLAS STEWART CARTER, : Priority No. 15 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
STATE'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendant-Appellant Douglas Stewart Carter (Carter) has 
petitioned for rehearing of this Court's opinion, State v. 
Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah March 2, 1994) ("Carter II"), 
affirming a sentence of death imposed for first degree murder, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990) (now aggravated murder, Supp. 
1993). Accepting this Court's May 19, 1994 invitation, the State 
now answers Carter's petition. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REHEARING 
The State reframes the questions presented in Carter's 
rehearing petition, as follows: 
1. Do Carter's Allegations of Flawed "Harmless Error" 
Disposition Warrant Rehearing of the Following Issues? 
a. Admission, at Carter's Second Penalty Hearing, 
of the Abstract of Testimony Given at His First Trial. 
b. Giving a "Heinousness" Instruction to the 
Second Penalty Hearing Jury. 
c. Admission of Victim Impact Evidence at the 
Second Penalty Hearing. 
2. Do Either "Cumulative Error" or Independent State 
Constitutional Analysis Warrant Rehearing this Appeal? 
3. Was There "Plain Error" in the Reasonable Doubt 
Instruction Given at Carter's Original 1985 Guilt Phase Trial? 
4. Do "Additional Points" Submitted Pro Se by Carter 
Warrant Rehearing this Appeal? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The federal constitutional "Due Process" clauses and 
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments," U.S. CONST. AMENDS 
V, VII, XIV, invoked by Carter, are familiar. The text of any 
other pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules 
will be set forth as needed in the main text of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The challenged death sentence was imposed following a 
second penalty hearing, held in 1992 after this Court's reversal 
of the death sentence imposed following Carter's original 1985 
trial and first penalty hearing, in State v. Carter, 116 P.2d 886 
(Utah 1989) (''Carter I"). In Carter II, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
19-21, this Court thoroughly recited the facts of the case. 
Those facts will be addressed as needed under the pertinent 
argument points of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Partial amendment of this Court's opinion affirming 
Carter's death sentence seems appropriate to clarify the 
"harmless error" analysis applied to certain issues. Such 
2 
clarification does not warrant a change in the resolution of 
Carter's appeal, however. 
Carter's "cumulative error" complaint fails because his 
complaints of error either fail altogether or can be deemed by 
this Court to be harmless even under a strict "beyond reasonable 
doubt" harmlessness review. Carter's attempt to achieve extra 
protection under the Utah Constitution's "Open Courts" clause has 
been waived, and is wholly unsupported by analysis. 
Carter's complaint of "plain error" in the "reasonable 
doubt" instruction given at his original 1985 trial fails because 
no "obvious" error can be committed via failure to anticipate 
this Court's later rejection of that instruction, which had 
enjoyed approval for about a century. Further, a recent United 
States Supreme Court decision makes clear that the challenged 
instruction passes federal constitutional scrutiny, even though 
it has been prohibited under this Court's supervisory authority. 
As clarified by this Court, that prohibition does not apply 
retroactively, and therefore does not apply to this case. 
Finally, Carter's pro se challenge to the aggravated 
burglary instruction, an aggravating circumstance that raised the 
murder to first degree murder, is meritless. The challenged 
instruction actually benefitted Carter, by omitting burglary 
aggravators that either duplicated aspects of the murder or were 




THE ALLEGED FLAWS IN THIS COURT'S "HARMLESS 
ERROR" RESOLUTION OF CERTAIN ISSUES WARRANT 
NO CHANGE IN THE OUTCOME OF CARTER'S APPEAL 
Carter first alleges that this Court erroneously held 
certain errors at the second penalty hearing to be harmless. He 
properly concedes that the United States Supreme Court permits 
appellate "harmlessness" analysis of errors in death penalty 
deliberations, e.g., demons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754 
(1990), Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257-58 (1988) (Pet. 
for Reh'g at 5). Nevertheless, Carter invites this Court to 
disclaim harmless error analysis of such deliberations as a means 
to "impose more . . . procedural protections on the capital 
defendant" (Pet. at 6). This Court should decline Carter's 
invitation, because he has not demonstrated that currently 
existing procedural protections are inadequate. 
Carter also correctly observes that two harmless error 
standards exist. For nonconstitutional error, the appellant must 
show a reasonable likelihood that, absent the alleged error, the 
trial court result would have been different. State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989). However, an error that violates 
constitutional rights is presumptively cause for reversal, unless 
the appellee can show that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-84 
(1986); State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987). As 
will be discussed, Carter's rehearing petition raises a fair 
4 
question about which harmless error standard might apply to 
certain issues in this case. 
Carter's specific allegations of error under this point 
challenge the manner in which this Court analyzed the admission 
of certain evidence at his second penalty hearing, plus a 
contention that the second penalty jury should not have been 
instructed on "heinousness" as an aggravating consideration. As 
follows, the alleged errors may warrant amendment, in part, of 
this Court's opinion; however, no change in this Court's 
affirmance of the death sentence is warranted. 
A. Transcript of Testimony Given at Carter's First 
Trial: Harmless Beyond Reasonable Doubt. 
Carter renews his contention that Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-207(4) (1990) was unconstitutionally used to admit the 
"abstracted" transcript of testimony given at his first trial. 
In this appeal, this Court construed section 76-3-207(4) to 
permit the reading of such transcripts to the jury, but banned 
their physical admission as evidentiary exhibits. This was done 
to cure section 76-3-207(4) of its infringement, in the Court's 
view, upon the Sixth Amendment "confrontation clause." Carter 
II, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24-25.1 
xThe State questions this and the other modifications that the 
Court engrafted on to the statute. It appears to the State that 
while purporting to "save" section 76-3-207(4) from constitutional 
defects, this Court really did something it has elsewhere 
disclaimed: it "edit[ed] the legislature's work to conform with 
this Court's view on how the statute should have been drafted." 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 487 (Utah 1988) (guoted in Br. of 
Appellee at 22). 
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The foregoing limiting construction of the statute was 
not observed at Carter's second penalty hearing; the trial court 
admitted the transcript as an exhibit. This oversight was 
understandable given that this Court's limiting construction was 
not yet in existence. However, Carter argues that because this 
Court at least implicitly deemed the transcript's admission to 
violate his confrontation right, the trial court's oversight 
amounted to constitutional error. Such error, he continues, 
presumptively requires reversal (Pet. at 8, numbered paras. 6-8). 
This Court does appear to have overlooked the question 
whether such error in the application of section 76-3-207(4) was 
nonconstitutional or constitutional in nature, and the question 
of which harmless error standard should apply. E.g., Carter II, 
233 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25-26 ("we do not find the error harmful or 
prejudicial"); id. at 26 ("we do not believe the impact of that 
evidence was unduly magnified by letting the jurors read what 
they had already heard"). It would be appropriate for this Court 
to amend its opinion, clarifying the harmlessness analysis that 
it has applied to the transcript admission problem.2 
Given the complex relationship between constitutional 
confrontation principles and nonconstitutional hearsay 
2Such amendment seems advisable in light of demons. In that 
case, the federal Supreme Court could not discern from the record 
whether the Mississippi Supreme Court applied the correct harmless 
error analysis, or "reweighing" of aggravating and mitigating 
factors, once it determined that one aggravator supporting a death 
sentence was flawed because of an improper jury instruction. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Mississippi 
Supreme Court for clarification. 494 U.S. at 754. 
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principles, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970), and 
further given that strict confrontation principles are 
inapplicable to capital penalty hearings, Williams v. New York, 
337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949), it is open to debate which standard for 
harmless error applies to this situation. Without conceding the 
question (and reserving its right to argue, upon fuller analysis, 
that a nonconstitutional harmlessness standard applies), the 
State believes that for purposes of deciding Carter's rehearing 
petition, even the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard 
is satisfied in this case. 
This stricter harmlessness standard is satisfied 
because Carter cannot complain that the content of the first 
trial transcript was inadmissible at his second penalty hearing; 
he complains only of the form in which that content was 
presented. The most damning content was the transcribed 
testimony of Epifanio and Lucia Tovar, who described how Carter, 
prior to murdering Eva Oleson, expressed an intention to "go 
rape, break, and drive." After the murder, Carter admitted his 
crime to the Tovars, even pantomiming it for them while laughing. 
Carter II, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26, 38 n. 18. 
As this Court aptly observed, the Tovars' transcribed 
testimony "undoubtedly had a dramatic impact simply from being 
read into the record." Id. at 26. Because the jury at Carter's 
second penalty hearing was thus overwhelmingly likely to remember 
the Tovars' testimony as it was read aloud to them, the effect of 
also being provided with a written transcript was trivial. 
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Accordingly, if admitting the transcript as an exhibit was error, 
such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. Proper Instruction About Heinous Murder. 
Carter next contends that the State presented 
insufficient evidence to justify instructing the second penalty 
jury on "heinousness" as an aggravating factor in support of a 
death sentence. Quoting State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1217 
(Utah 1989), Carter argues that the way in which he murdered Eva 
Oleson was not "qualitatively and quantitatively different and 
more culpable than that necessary to accomplish the murder," and 
that the evidence failed to show that he intended "to cause 
wholly unnecessary suffering" to Mrs. Oleson (Pet. at 10). 
Therefore, the argument goes, it was improper to instruct the 
jury about heinousness, as "demonstrated by physical torture, 
serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim 
before death," Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1) (q) (Supp. 1992). 
But as this Court recognized, Carter in fact did commit 
acts that were significantly different than those necessary to 
murder Eva Oleson. Carter tied Mrs. Oleson's hands behind her 
and stripped her naked below the waist. Carter II, 233 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 19. Rather than shoot her immediately--a dubiously "less 
heinous" approach--Carter then stabbed Mrs. Oleson numerous 
times; by his own confession, she then lay moaning as Carter 
explored her home for items to steal (Br. of Appellee at 47). 
In light of the foregoing evidence, the State maintains 
its position that the heinousness instruction was properly given 
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(Br. of Appellee at 46-49). Even if Carter's treatment of Mrs. 
Oleson might not be labelled "torture," it certainly amounted to 
"serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim 
before death" under the heinousness definition. It was therefore 
proper to instruct the jury on this statutory aggravating factor. 
While the Court avoided this question, Carter II, 233 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 29, it need not have done so. 
This Court correctly acknowledged that even if 
improperly instructed on "heinousness," the jury was bound to 
consider Carter's actions against Mrs. Oleson in any event, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2) (1990). Carter II, 233 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 29. This provision admits any sentence-relevant 
evidence, "including but not limited to the nature and 
circumstances of the crime . . .." Because individualized 
sentencing is the rule, section 76-3-207(2) clearly permitted--
indeed, probably demanded--jury consideration of Carter's 
particular actions.3 And because the aggravating factor of 
aggravated burglary legitimately made Carter death-eligible in 
any event, the jury permissibly considered Carter's particular 
abuse of Mrs. Oleson in its sentencing deliberations. 
This Court also accurately held that even if the 
heinousness instruction should not have been given, error in 
giving it was harmless. The second sentencing jury could--and, 
the State submits, did--find Carter's abuse of Mrs. Oleson to be 
3Thus Carter is wrong in his assertion that the "heinousness" 
instruction was "the sole means to present such a [penalty] 
framework to the jury" (Pet. at 16, numbered para. 3). 
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far worse than what a "simple murderer" (Pet. at 20) would do. 
Accordingly, any hypothesized error in giving the heinousness 
instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
C. Victim Impact Evidence: No Constitutional Error. 
Carter re-assails the admission of victim impact 
evidence as presumptively reversible constitutional error under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution (Pet. at 22). He mistakenly ignores the specific 
holding of Payne v. Tennessee, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 2597 
(1991), recognized by this Court in Carter II, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 32, that victim impact evidence can be admitted under these 
constitutional provisions. 
Therefore, if this Court correctly deemed that the 
victim impact evidence in this case was inadmissible under the 
factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2) (1990), such 
error clearly was not constitutional in nature; only a statutory 
provision was violated. Therefore, the "beyond reasonable doubt" 
standard for harmlessness does not apply; instead, it is Carter's 
burden to show that the error was harmful. His burden is made 
heavier given that this Court has already held that the asserted 
error was harmless. Carter II, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33. In his 
rehearing petition, Carter makes no effort to carry his burden of 
proving harm; therefore, his argument fails. Overall, none of 
Carter's "harmful error" complaints under this point give cause 
to set aside the death sentence. 
10 
POINT TWO 
NEITHER "CUMULATIVE ERROR" NOR INDEPENDENT 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS WARRANT 
REHEARING OF THIS APPEAL 
Arguing that the alleged errors discussed in Point One 
of this brief were cumulatively harmful, and thus cause for 
reversing his death sentence, Carter misreads a part of demons 
v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990). The passage cited by Carter 
(Pet. at 25) did not state that appellate harmless error analysis 
is necessarily "extremely speculative or impossible." Rather, 
the Court said: "In some situations, a state appellate court may-
conclude that peculiarities in a case make appellate reweighing 
or harmless-error analysis extremely speculative or impossible." 
demons, 494 U.S. at 754 (emphasis added). Implicit in this 
Court's resolution of Carter II is a sound conclusion that it did 
not require extreme speculation to find that any errors in 
Carter's second penalty hearing, individually or cumulatively, 
were not so harmful as to require reversal. 
In fact, as set forth in Point One of this brief, 
Carter's arguments on the admission of the first trial 
transcript, and evidence of the "heinous" or especially abusive 
treatment of the victim, would in no way bar presentation of the 
underlying evidence to the second penalty jury: only the 
particular presentation form, or framework for considering that 
evidence, would be implicated. And due to the limited nature of 
the challenged victim impact testimony, that evidence was not 
unduly prejudicial. Carter II, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33. 
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Summarizing the matter in familiar terms, this Court reasonably 
concluded that even if Carter did not have a perfect second 
penalty hearing, he had a fair one. Cf. State v. Andrews, 843 
P.2d 1027, 1034 (Utah 1992) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) ("[E]ven 
where death is the penalty, perfection is not the standard by 
which we are to judge counsel, the jury, the trial judge, or the 
appellate proceedings"). 
Carter's claim that this Court's harmless error 
judgments violated the Utah Constitution is set forth as a 
separate point in his Petition for Rehearing--where he raises it 
for the first time. Besides having been thus waived, the point 
consists of merely a single sentence, quoting the constitution's 
"Open Courts Clause." Thus lacking in analysis, the point should 
be summarily rejected. See State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 
(Utah 1988) (appellate court is not a "dumping ground" for 
undeveloped arguments). 
POINT THREE 
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE "PLAIN ERROR" IN THE 
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION GIVEN AT 
CARTER'S ORIGINAL 1985 GUILT PHASE TRIAL 
In the third point in his Petition for Rehearing, 
Carter alleges alleges that the "reasonable doubt" instruction 
given at the guilt phase of his original 1985 trial was 
erroneous. Because this issue has not been previously presented 
in this case, it can only be reached via the "plain error" 
analysis of State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), which 
requires Carter to show that the instruction was (1) erroneous; 
12 
(2) "obviously" or "palpably" so; and (3) prejudicial, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable guilt phase result. Id. at 1208-09. Carter has not 
proven plain error. Shuffling the order of these elements a bit, 
the "obviousness" and "error" elements are absent. 
The 1985 reasonable doubt instruction (R. 167, 
partially set forth in Pet. at 26-27) contains language 
equivalent to the "more weighty affairs of life" formulation that 
this Court, acting in its "supervisory capacity," later forbade 
in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 1989). Later 
still, in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147-49 (Utah 1989) 
(concurring opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Durham and 
Zimmerman, JJ.), three members of this Court again condemned the 
"weighty affairs" formulation of reasonable doubt.4 However, 
only Justice Stewart has contended that a "weighty affairs" 
instruction given in a pre-Ireland case was obviously or 
"palpably" erroneous. See Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 230 
(Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., dissenting, in appeal from denial of 
state postconviction relief; trial court conviction in 1983); 
State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 30-31 (Utah 1994) 
4Then-Chief Justice Hall, who wrote the main opinion in 
Johnson, disapproved the concurring justices' decision to reach the 
reasonable doubt instruction issue, which had not been argued or 
briefed by the parties. Johnson, 77'4 P.2d at 1146. 
The reasonable doubt jury instruction at Carter's second 
penalty hearing, in 1992, properly omitted the "weighty affairs" 
language (Instruction No. 6, copied in the State's Br. of Appellee, 
Appendix XII). 
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{Menzies II) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part; trial court conviction in 1988). 
Carter now joins Justice Stewart's contention that a 
"weighty affairs" instruction, given years before this Court 
forbade it, is "palpably" erroneous. The most direct answer to 
that contention^ however, is that Carter's trial court, in 1985, 
like that of Tillman in 1983 and of Menzies in 1988, cannot be 
said to have "palpably" erred by failing to predict that in 1989, 
the "weighty affairs" formulation of reasonable doubt would be 
forbidden; after all, it had been approved nearly a century 
earlier by the United States Supreme Court, in Hopt v. Utah, 120 
U.S. 430, 439-41 (1887) (holding "weighty and important concerns" 
formulation to be "as just a guide to practical men as can well 
be given . . . " ) . Accordingly, the "obviousness" or "palpable" 
element of plain error is not met in Carter's belated challenge 
to the 1985 reasonable doubt instruction. 
Nor is the "error" element satisfied--at least as a 
matter of federal constitutional law. In Victor v. Nebraska, No. 
92-8894, U.S.L.W. , 54 Cr. L. 2225 (March 22, 1994) 
(consolidated with Sandoval v. California, No. 92-9049), the 
United States Supreme Court upheld a Nebraska jury instruction 
that stated, among other things: "'Reasonable doubt' is such a 
doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent person, in one of 
the graver and more important transactions of life, to pause and 
hesitate before taking the represented facts as true and relying 
and acting thereon." Victor, 54 Cr. L. at 2229 (emphasis added). 
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In upholding the instruction against a Due Process Clause 
challenge, the Court observed that the emphasized language "is a 
formulation we have repeatedly approved[.]" Id. at 2230 (citing 
Hopt and Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)). 
Because the "graver and more important transactions" 
language in the Nebraska instruction is equivalent to the 
"weighty affairs" formulation used prior to this Court's Ireland 
ruling, it seems clear that the latter formulation also passes 
federal Due Process muster. Accordingly, because there is no 
constitutional error in the use of the instruction, the "error" 
element of plain error is unmet. It therefore does not matter 
whether some different reasonable doubt instruction, if requested 
and given, might have achieved an acquittal for Carter: this 
"prejudice" element of plain error obviously does not apply when 
obvious error is absent. 
It bears mention that Carter may mean to argue that 
this Court's prohibition of the "weighty affairs" reasonable 
doubt formulation in Ireland should retroactively apply to his 
case. That would be correct only if Ireland established a new 
rule of federal constitutional law, inasmuch as Carter's first 
appeal was still pending when Ireland was issued. See Griffith 
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). However, as the federal 
Supreme Court's Victor opinion makes clear, Ireland cannot be 
construed to rest upon federal Due Process principles. Instead, 
it rests only upon this Court's supervisory authority, 773 P.2d 
15 
at 1380.5 Consistent with this, in Menzies II, 235 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 32 n.7, this Court declared that the Ireland ruling was 
only prospective in its operation. In sum, any argument for 
application of the Ireland ruling to this case--be it "plain 
error" or retroactivity--cannot prevail. 
POINT FOUR 
CARTER'S "ADDITIONAL, POINTS," SUBMITTED PRO 
SE, DO NOT WARRANT REHEARING THIS APPEAL 
Carter's pro se arguments for rehearing really boil 
down to one argument, dealing with the 1985 guilt phase trial: 
Carter asserts that he was not properly put on notice, as a 
matter of due process, of his need to defend against the 
aggravated burglary charge, encompassed within the first degree 
murder charge. That argument is frivolous. 
The criminal information filed against Carter in 1985 
clearly accuses him of intentionally killing Eva Oleson under 
five alternative circumstances, raising the killing to first 
degree murder under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(d) (Supp. 1985) 
(R. 26-27) . The second of those circumstances specifies the 
allegation that "the homicide was committed while the actor was 
engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit aggravated 
burglary" (R. 26). This put Carter on notice that to defend 
himself against the first degree murder charge, he would have to 
5Nor can the State find any indication that the Ireland ruling 
was ever intended to rest upon an independent, state constitution-
based due process ground, UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 7. 
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defend against the aggravating circumstance of aggravated 
burglary, defined in Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-203, -202 (1990). 
Carter's related argument about the 1985 jury 
instruction on the elements of aggravated burglary is similarly 
frivolous. He complains of a variance between the offense as 
statutorily defined and as instructed at his trial (Pet. at 33). 
That variance existed because the instruction omitted 
burglary aggravators that were duplicative of the injuries 
inflicted while murdering Eva Oleson, i.e., "causes bodily 
injury" and "uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon," Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(1)(a), -(b) (1990). Instead, 
the instruction relied solely upon the subsection (1)(c) burglary 
aggravator--"possesses or attempts to use any explosive or 
dangerous weapon." That aggravator was also tailored to the 
minimum necessary to fit the particular facts of Carter's 
offense, to read simply "defendant was armed with or possessed a 
deadly weapon" (R. 118, Pet. at 33). 
By thus tailoring the aggravated burglary instruction 
to require a finding of only one burglary aggravator, Carter's 
defense was actually aided. He did not need to defend against 
the aggravator of causing injury or threatening Eva Oleson (even 
though he clearly did these things); nor did possession of an 
"explosive" weapon enter into the picture. He only had to defend 
against the allegation that he possessed a deadly weapon when he 
committed burglary by unlawfully entering or remaining in Eva 
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Oleson's home. Carter's argument on this point therefore clearly 
does not warrant rehearing of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth in Point One of this brief, amendment of 
this Court's opinion to clarify the "harmless error" standards 
under certain issues would be appropriate. Neither such 
amendment, nor any other of the alleged flaws in this Court's 
opinion, affirming Carter's death sentence, warrants further 
rehearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of July, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY1 
Assistant Attorney General 
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